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Abstract
Nudges are small, often imperceptible changes to how particular decisions present themselves to individuals that 
are meant to influence those decisions. In his editorial, ‘Nudging by shaming, shaming by nudging’, Eyal highlights 
links between nudges and feelings of shame on the part of the ‘chooser’. In this commentary, I suggest two further 
distinctions between different types of shame-based nudges that should affect our assessment of such nudges. 
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The idea of ‘nudges’ – small, often imperceptible changes to choice ‘architectures’ that are meant to exert a positive influence on people’s choices – has gained a 
lot of traction in recent years. Its most prominent proponents, 
Thaler and Sunstein, argue that nudges are attractive because 
they can help individuals make decisions that they themselves 
would regard as better, without curtailing their liberties (1). 
Nir Eyal’s paper draws a number of important links between 
nudges and feelings of shame on the part of the ‘chooser’. 
Eyal suggests that, first, shame could play a significant role 
in certain types of nudges. For example, smoking bans may 
influence smoking behaviour by signalling that smoking is 
regarded as socially undesirable, thereby causing smokers to 
feel shame. Second, Eyal highlights that the role of shaming in 
certain types of nudges can make their use more problematic 
than other, more restrictive types of interventions (2). 
Eyal’s discussion highlights an important problem with 
current debates about public health interventions. In 
many discussions, the central criterion for assessing such 
interventions is the degree to which they restrict individuals’ 
liberties: more restrictive strategies, which limit or curtail 
what individuals can do, are generally regarded as more 
problematic than strategies that involve lesser interference 
with individuals’ freedom of choice. The Nuffield Council’s 
influential ‘intervention ladder’, which suggests that we 
think of the range of policy options open to policy-makers 
as positioned along a ladder with increasing restrictions on 
citizens’ liberties, is a case in point (3). Eyal argues that the 
focus on liberty restrictions misses important dimensions of 
how public health interventions can influence individuals’ 
behaviour; shaming and its possible negative effects on 
choosers are one such dimension. Less restrictive interventions 
that induce feelings of shame to shape individual choices can, 
he argues, be more problematic than more restrictive ones that 
do not rely on shame-based mechanisms. As Eyal emphasises, 
the current focus on the relative restrictiveness of different 
health promotion strategies may cause us to lose sight of this 
aspect of health interventions.
It is particularly important to explore the link between nudges 
and shaming because proponents of nudges seem to approve 
of the shaming effects some nudges rely on. Consider, for 
example, Thaler and Sunstein’s discussion of how nudges 
can encourage people to use less energy. They consider a 
US study in which electricity bills informed customers how 
their energy use compared with the average energy use in 
their neighbourhood. This led above-average energy users 
to decrease their energy use but also led to a ‘boomerang 
effect’: below-average users ended up increasing their energy 
use. However, when the invoices also included an emoticon 
signalling approval (for those who were using less energy than 
their neighbours) or disapproval (for above-average users), 
the boomerang effect disappeared. Thaler and Sunstein 
speak approvingly of this kind of nudge, which goes beyond 
simply telling people how their behaviour compares to that of 
others [an approach sometimes referred to as ‘social norms 
marketing’ (4)] and instead relies on clear signals of social 
(dis) approval so as to ensure that behaviour changes in the 
desired direction. 
In this commentary, I want to highlight two distinctions 
not raised by Eyal that I think should be relevant to ongoing 
debates about public health interventions, nudges and the 
use of shame. First, some nudges are paternalistic—i.e. they 
interfere with choices so as to improve the health or welfare 
of the chooser—while others are meant to benefit third 
parties. Second, some nudges rely on shame arising in specific 
situation whereas others (also) create or contribute to broader 
stigmatisation in an effort to shape behaviours. While shaming 
strikes me as a prima facie problematic strategy for changing 
people’s behaviours, it is not, I think, plausible to argue 
that shaming is never permissible, irrespective of whatever 
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possible positive effects it may have. Even Martha Nussbaum, 
who takes a very strong position against the use of shaming 
because she regards it as inconsistent with basic commitments 
to equality, allows for the possibility that, under very specific 
circumstances, shaming could be ‘constructive’ (5). Shame 
can be used in a variety of different ways and different uses 
of shame may create different types of concerns. Our debates 
about the use of shame should therefore consider what, 
precisely, makes the use of shame problematic in particular 
instances and also aim to distinguish between more and 
less problematic instances of shaming. The two distinctions 
suggested here should make a difference to how we assess the 
acceptability of different kinds of nudging-by-shaming.
 
Paternalistic vs. non-paternalistic shaming 
A first distinction that must not be conflated as we consider 
different strategies that are being employed to influence 
individuals’ behaviours is whether the goal is to improve 
the health or well-being of the chooser or instead that of a 
third party. Sunstein and Thaler originally defined their 
approach as ‘libertarian paternalism’, suggesting that nudges 
were primarily meant as a way to improve the well-being of 
the chooser: ‘we argue for self-conscious efforts… to steer 
people’s choices in directions that will improve their lives. 
In our understanding, a policy is “paternalistic” if it tries to 
influence choices in a way that will make choosers better 
off…’ (1). At the same time, many of the nudges they discuss 
are meant to benefit third parties rather than the chooser 
and therefore are not paternalistic in this sense. For example, 
they make suggestions on how to increase organ donation, 
where the goal is to increase the supply of available organs, 
not to benefit potential donors (1). Similarly, some of the 
interventions Eyal discusses (such as Michael Bloomberg’s 
failed super-size soft drink ban) seem to be primarily 
paternalistically motivated whereas others (such as nudges to 
increase patients’ willingness to be treated by trainee doctors) 
are not. 
Whether a particular intervention is motivated by the well-
being of the chooser or instead that of third parties should 
affect our assessment of its acceptability. When third parties 
are actively harmed by someone’s choices, government 
intervention often strikes us not only as permissible but 
in fact required. When someone’s choices harm only the 
chooser, however, we often think that the bar for interventions 
should be much higher. If we accept this reasoning, then 
this also has implications for nudging-by-shaming. When 
nudges are used to prevent choices that involve harms to third 
parties, they seem less problematic than when they are used to 
interfere paternalistically – even when they rely on shaming 
to influence the chooser.
Of course, many choices affect both the chooser and third 
parties, making the distinction between paternalistic and 
non-paternalistic nudging tricky to maintain. Moreover, even 
with other-regarding actions, the seriousness of the harm the 
chooser might be imposing on others, or the benefit they are 
denying them, can vary greatly. It is not obvious that nudging-
by-shaming would be acceptable with respect to any of these 
choices and I am not taking a position on this here; rather, 
I want to emphasise that shaming seems less problematic 
(though still problematic) in instances where people are not 
doing what they ought to do or are failing in certain moral 
duties that they owe to others than it does in contexts where 
choosers could be acting in ways that are better for themselves. 
‘Situational’ shaming vs. shaming through broader social 
norms 
The second distinction I would like to highlight focuses 
on the mechanisms through which shame operates to 
influence individuals’ behaviour. In some of the nudges Eyal 
discusses, shame is induced in very specific situations (often 
interactions with another person). For example, in the case 
of the super-size soft drink ban, feelings of shame seem to 
arise if customers feel embarrassment when returning for 
drink refills ‘under the gaze of other customers and vendors’ 
(2). With other nudges, the shaming seems to work through 
broader social norms that influence behaviour and are not 
isolated to specific social interactions. Consider, for example, 
smoking bans. As Eyal suggests, these influence individuals’ 
behaviour through ‘subtle stigma’, (2) signaling to smokers 
that they are engaging in a behaviour that society disapproves 
of. This ‘subtle stigma’ may be situational: smokers may feel 
shame when they are required to leave buildings in order to 
smoke. [And indeed smokers report feeling like ‘lepers’ as 
a result of such bans (6).] At the same time, however, this 
kind of legislation is often intended to set in motion much 
broader denormalisation effects that in turn are expected 
to affect smoking behaviours (4). As Stanton Glantz puts it, 
smoking bans are effective because they ‘implicitly defin[e] 
smoking as an antisocial act’ (7). While the mechanisms are 
very different, in both cases social disapproval is signalled to 
smokers and it is the resulting shame that becomes part of 
the choice architecture, ‘nudging’ their behaviour towards a 
reduction in smoking.  
Why might this difference matter? With nudges where 
individuals are exposed to shame only if and when they 
engage in a particular behaviour—whenever they request a 
refill on their soft drink, for example—any feelings of shame 
the chooser experiences are isolated to a particular interaction 
and can be avoided quite easily. On the other hand, nudges 
that work through, or rely upon, the broader stigmatisation 
of particular behaviours are likely to be more pervasive in 
their effects, often including effects that are problematic for 
the chooser’s health. There have been concerns, for example, 
that the stigmatisation of smoking (driven by a range of 
policies, including the kind of smoking bans Eyal discusses) 
can lead smokers to conceal their smoking status from health 
professionals and as a result lose out on the cessation advice 
those professionals might have been able to provide (8). 
Nudges in which shame is limited to particular situations 
and does not have ‘spillover’ effects may therefore be less 
problematic from a normative perspective – even if, of course, 
as Eyal highlights, even situational shaming can be very 
problematic.
Conclusion
Nudges have been met with significant interest from policy-
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makers as they consider possible strategies to improve 
population health. The possibility that nudges, like many 
other kinds of interventions, can induce shame—that, in fact, 
they rely on shame to effect behavioural changes—should 
be an important aspect of ongoing debates about strategies 
to improve population health. As Eyal highlights, the focus 
on restrictiveness that has dominated the debate on public 
health interventions is unhelpful; our assessment of public 
health interventions must be based on a much broader set of 
normative concerns.
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